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1. INTRODUCTIONFOR nearly two decades, the United States has attempted to stem
the tide of illicit narcotics entering its borders from South Ameri-
can countries in the Andean region.' In December 1991, Congress
enacted the Andean Trade Preference Act .2 Congress passed this Act as
a specific and deliberate measure to combat the production and traffick-
ing of illegal drugs coming from Andean South America .3
In theory, by providing economic incentives for Andean countries to
focus their domestic agricultural and manufacturing efforts on legal
goods, they will decrease their relative focus on producing and distribut-
ing narcotics. 4  But in practice, the results have not met these
expectations. 5
Despite the lackluster results emergent from the years immediately fol-
lowing the Andean Trade Preference Act-or perhaps because of those
results-Congress not only renewed, but also expanded the scope of the
Act.6 In 2002, Congress enacted the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug
Eradication Act .7 This new and, some would say, improved iteration of
the Andean Trade Preference Act applies to the same selection of coun-
tries, subject to the same qualification requirements. 8 But the provisions
1. The Andean Trade Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105 Stat 1233 (1991)
(Trade Preference Act).
2. Id.
3. See generally, Office of the United States Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.
gov/Trade..Development/Preference..Programts/ATPA/SectionI ndex.html (last
visited March 4, 2009) (Office of the United States Trade Representative Website).
4. See J.F. H{ORNBECK, THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE Ae-r: BACKGROUND AND





7. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210,
116 Stat. 933 (2002).
8. Id.
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differ from those of its predecessor in offering a greatly expanded list of
products eligible for duty-free treatment.
In the years following these enactments, the composition of goods from
the Andean countries has shown only marginal change. Even so, Con-
gress and the President have repeatedly passed extensions to provide for
the Trade Agreements' continuation. This Comment seeks to demon-
strate that the Andean Trade Preference Agreements, in their attempts to
forestall narcotics proliferation from the Andean countries, have failed.
It. TRADE PREFERENCE ACTS-A BACKGROUND
Trade preference programs are tools used by the U.S. government to
help developing countries "through enhanced access to the U.S. mar-
ket." Generally, a common feature of this type of enhanced trade rela-
tionship is duty-free treatment to various qualifying goods.' 0
In addition to the Andean Trade Preference programs, the Office of
the United States Trade Representative also has other trade preference
arrangements."I The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), for ex-
ample, remains one of the oldest and most successful preference pro-
grams.' 2 This program, instituted in 1976, has been reauthorized through
the end of 2009.13 Like other preference programs, the GSP was aimed
at promoting economic growth for countries in the developing world.' 4
Under the GSP, the United States offers enhanced status to nearly five
thousand products from over 130 countries.' 5
Along with the GSP, there are at least two other U.S. trade preference
systems: the highly successful African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).' 6 The AGOA, en-
acted in 2000, provides duty-free treatment to products from countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa.' 7 The CBI began in 1983 as the Caribbean Basin
Recovery Act. Congress expanded the Act in 2000, creating the Carib-
bean Basin Trade Partnership Act.' 8 The CBI provides enhanced trading
arrangements to nineteen beneficiary countries.' 9
9. U.S. Trade Rep., ATPA, supra note 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/




16. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Preference Programs, http://www.ustr.
gov/t rade- top ics/trade-de ve lop men t/p re fere nce- programs (last visited Sept. 20,
2009).
17. Id.
18. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), http://
www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-ba-
sin-initiative-cbi (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
19. Id.
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111. THE 1991 ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCES ACT
In December of 1991, Congress enacted the Andean Trade Preference
Act. 20 This Act, which initially had a ten-year sunset period, provided
duty-free, or reduced-tariff, status to a variety of products coming into
the United States from the countries in South America's Andean re-
gion.2' When originally enacted, the Act's primary stated goal was "to
promote export diversification and broad-based economic development
that provides sustainable economic alternatives to drug-crop production
in the Andean region."12 2 Because almost all of the illegal cocaine sold
within the United States comes from countries in the Andean region,
many viewed the Andean Trade Preference Act as a vital tool in contrib-
uting to the United States' fight against illegal drug production and
trafficking.23
A. COUNTRY QUALIFICATIONS AND BENEFITIED PRODUCTS
In order to benefit from the Trade Preference Act, both the country
and the goods it seeks to export must qualify.2 4 From the outset, the Act
sets its scope to include only four countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
and Peru.25 Before those countries can benefit from the Act, they must
first qualify under the Act's set standards.26 Specifically, the Trade Pref-
erence Act provides that the president may not designate any country a
beneficiary country under the Act if the U.S. government determines that
that the country is a communist country.27 Further, the president may
not provide beneficiary status to any country that has wrongfully seized
any property, physical or intellectual, from a U.S. citizen or U.S. business
enterprise. 28 Additionally, the president may not recognize for benefici-
ary status a country that fails to act in good faith to recognize or enforce
an arbitration award in favor of the United States or a citizen of the
United States, or an enterprise that is at least fifty percent owned by U.S.
citizens. 29
Moreover, providing its own preferential treatment to other developed
countries might affect the country's status under the Trade Preference
Act.3 0~ If the United States determines that the country's preferential
treatment to the other developed nation has a significant and adverse
20. Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (1991).
21. Id.
22. Testimony on Renewal of the Andean Trade Preference Act Before the Sen. Fin.
Comm., Subcomm. on Intn'l Trade, 107th Cong. (2001), (Statement by Ambassa-
dor Peter Ailgeler, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
TradeD eve Iopme nt/Pre fere nce..Programs/ATPA/assetu p load-fi letI 13_3787.pdf.
23. See id.
24. See Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (2002).
25. Id. at § 3202(b)(1).
26. Id. at § 3202(c).
27. Id. at § 3202(c)(1).
28. Id. at § 3202(c)(2)(A), 3202(c)(2)(B)(ii).
29. Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3202(c)(3) (2002).
30. Id. at § 3202(c)(4).
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effect on the United States, then that country is likewise subject to prefer-
ential status denial under the Act.3'
Additionally, the Trade Preference Act requires that the government
of any potential beneficiary country not engage in the unlawful distribu-
tion or broadcasting of copyrighted materials.32 That country must also
have taken, or currently be taking, steps to afford internationally recog-
nized worker rights to their country's workers.33 Finally, the country
must be a signatory to a treaty, convention, protocol, or other agreement
regarding the extradition of U.S. citizens.34
In addition to those formal requirements listed, the Act also establishes
other factors for the president to consider in determining whether to
grant or deny a country beneficiary status.3 5 The factors listed include
considerations regarding: whether the country has expressed a desired to
gain benefits under the Act; the country's economic conditions and the
living standards of its citizens; the extent to which the country has pro-
vided assurances that it will provide reasonable access to the country's
markets and resources; the degree to which the country follows accepted
rules of international trade provided for under the World Trade Organi-
zation Agreement and multilateral trade agreements; the degree to which
the country's trade policies, as related to other possible beneficiary coun-
tries, are contributing to the region's revitalization; the degree to which
the country is undertaking self-help measures to secure its own economic
development; and the extent to which the country has cooperated with
the United States in its anti-narcotics efforts.36
Once a country qualifies under the requirements of the Act, the goods
it wishes to import into the United States must also qualify. 37 Generally,
only goods imported directly from one of the beneficiary countries into
the United States are eligible. 38 Then, the "content of materials and
processing costs originating in... ATPA beneficiary countries.., and up
to 15 percentage points of U.S. origin value must sum to at least 35% of
the value of the article when it enters the United States."139 Additionally,
the Act lists certain articles to which it specifically denies duty-free sta-
tus.4 0 These include: textile and apparel articles subject to textile agree-
ments; footwear not designed as eligible under the general system of
preferences; prepared or preserved tuna; petroleum or petroleum prod-
ucts4 1; watches and watch parts; sugars, syrups, and molasses; and rum
31. Id.
32. Id. § 3202(c)(5).
33. Id. § 3202(c)(7).
34. Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3202(c)(6) (2002).
35. Id. § 3202(d).
36. Id.
37. Id. at § 3203(a).
38. Id. at § 3203(a)(1)(A).
39. HORNBECK, CRS REPORT, supra note 3.
40. Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3203(b) (2002).
41. Id. at § 3203(b)(4).
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and tafia .4 2
After implementation of the Trade Preference Act, Colombia and Bo-
livia were the first two countries to qualify under the guidelines, each
qualifying in the middle of 1992.43 And about a year later, Peru and Ec-
uador were likewise qualified and became beneficiary countries under the
Act .4 4
B. FOREIGN EFFECTrIVENESS
With the expiration of the Andean Trade Preference Act set for De-
cember of 2001, Congress and the Bush Administration were faced with
the task of determining what fate should befall the lapsing trade program.
Their primary consideration in making that determination was the degree
to which the Act had been effective at achieving its objectives.45
Lawmakers looked to a number of indicators to determine what, if any,
success the Trade Preference Act had achieved .4 6 First, they looked to
see if there has been any change in reported drug production and traffick-
ing activity coming from the Andean Region .4 7 Second, they looked to
see if there had been any change in the overall trade volume between the
United States and the Andean beneficiary countries .483 Finally, they ex-
amined any variation in the composition of the goods being imported
from the beneficiary countries.49 A report produced by the Congres-
sional Research Service (CRS) in 2001 provides a suitable summary of
the results from the investigation. 50
In addressing the first factor, the CRS Report notes that there had in-
deed been some reduction in the production and trafficking of illegal nar-
cotics during the ten-year period the Trade Preference Act has been in
effect.5 ' More precisely, the report notes that the there has been an
eleven percent overall reduction in the cultivation of cocaine between
1991 and 1999.52 That figure represents a fifty-five percent decrease in
production coming from Bolivia, and a sixty-eight percent reduction from
Peru.53 But that illustrates only part of the story.54 That nearly ten -year
period also witnessed an increase in Colombian drug production by ap-
proximately 227 percent.55
42. Id.
43. HORNBECK, CRS REPORT, supra note 3.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Although this is an indication of some changes taking place during the
period in question, it is difficult to establish firmly whether the Trade
Preference Act caused any of these changes.56 Identifying the specific
effects of the Trade Preference Act and differentiating them from the
effects of other anti-narcotic programs or economic development incen-
tives remains problematic. 57 Generally, however, the studies that ex-
amine this question have identified, at best, a marginal effect on crop
substitution efforts as an anti-narcotics tool.5 8
Examining results from the differences in overall trade volume be-
tween the United States and the Andean beneficiary countries provides
similarly unimpressive results.59 From the enactment of the Trade Prefer-
ence Act through the end of its first decade, U.S. trade with Andean ben-
eficiary countries has remained comparatively small.60 It has grown on
par with average growth for U.S. trade generally, worldwide.61 On a "rel-
ative basis, United States exports to ATPA countries have remained
largely unchanged at approximately [1 percent] of total exports to the
world."162 U.S. imports from Andean beneficiary countries have main-
tained similarly unchanged levels. 63
With little noticeable change from either the first or second indicators,
examination proceeds by investigating any differences in the actual com-
position of the articles the Andean beneficiary countries imported into
the United States. 64 The CRS Report shows data gathered from the U.S.
International Trade Commission regarding import composition during
the period of interest here.65 The primary U.S. imports from the Andean
beneficiary countries at the end of the period were: mineral fuels; pre-
cious stones and metals; spices, coffee, and tea; edible fruits and nuts,
mostly bananas; fish and seafood; apparel; live plants and trees, specifi-
cally cut flowers; and copper articles, primarily cathodes.66 Among the
largest of these imports, petroleum products and petroleum-based prod-
ucts were ineligible for duty-free or enhanced trading status under the
Trade Preference Act.67 The only noticeable change in the composition
of imports during the entire period in question was the increase in refined
copper cathode imports from Peru.68 By contrast, there was also a rela-
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 2.
58. HORNBECK, CRS REPORT, su~pra note 3, at 2.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id. at 2.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id.
63. HORNBECK, CRS REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-4.
64. Id. at 5; see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N., SEVENTH REPORT TO'
CONGRESS ON THE IMPACTr OF TIHE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE ACT' ON U.S.
INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS AND ON DRUG CROP ERADICATION AND CROP SUB-
STIrI iON, (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/pubs
332/pub3358.pdf, [hereinafter SEVENTH TRA1)E REPORT].
65. HORNBIECK, CRS REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 5-6.
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tive decrease in the coffee and seafood imports from the region.69
The findings in the CRS Report attribute these minimal changes in im-
port composition to three factors.70 First, most of the U.S. imports from
Andean beneficiary countries were natural- resource based products or
simple manufacturing goods.7' Many of those types of articles were not
eligible for the enhanced trade status under the Trade Preference Act.7 2
Second, because petroleum products constitute such a large portion of
the U.S. imports, their value tends to distort the overall importation
figures, instead reflecting general variations in worldwide oil prices. 73 Fi-
nally, Colombia emerged as the dominant trade partner in the Andean
region.74 Imports from Colombia made up sixty percent of the total U.S.
imports by the end of the decade from the Andean nations.75 And be-
cause Colombia's primary import goods to the United States are petro-
leum based products, it is no surprise that the trade figures resulting from
petroleum imports would skew those figures for the remaining imports.76
Rather than simply concluding that the data showed no significant
change during the course of the Trade Preference program and end the
study, the inquiry went further to investigate whether there were any
changes in trade data at the individual article level. 7 7 If the Trade Prefer-
ence Act had not affected imports on an aggregate level, perhaps it had
had some effect on individual products or articles coming from the An-
dean nations into the United States.78 In order to determine if any spe-
cific products were benefiting from the enhanced trade status, the
Congressional Research Service first attempted to determine what por-
tion of articles entering the United States did so exclusively under eligi-
bility from the Trade Preference Act, and not through some other trade
program or enhancement option.79
Studies of the data, presented in both the CRS Report and the U.S.
International Trade Commission Report issued in 2000, indicate that only
ten percent of the total imports coming from the Andean beneficiary
countries come to the United States under the benefit of the Trade Pref-
erence Act.80 This result means that a full ninety percent of goods im-
ported into the United States from the four beneficiary countries arrive
either without a preferential status or by way of another trade or prefer-
ence agreement.8 ' Contrasting the data from 1995 with that from 1999,









78. HORNBECK, CRS REPORT. supra note 3.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 7; see also SEVENTH TRADE REPORT, supra note 63.
81. HORNBECK, CRS REPORT, supra note 3.
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the end of the original Trade Preference Act period, shows no difference
in this figure between the years.82 Trade Preference Act imports repre-
sented only ten percent of the total imports from the beneficiary coun-
tries at both points, leading to a preliminary conclusion that the Trade
Preference Act had done little to change the overall amount of goods and
articles being imported under the Act.83 This is unlikely to change if the
Trade Preference Act is left as-is, the report concludes, because the ma-
jority of imports from the Andean beneficiary countries come in the form
of textiles and petroleum products. 8 4 Neither of these is eligible for duty-
free or reduced-tariff status under the Trade Preference Act.85
While this data continues to support the idea that, on aggregate, the
Trade Preference Act has little effect on import composition, it had not
yet directly addressed the question on an individual product level.816 The
data demonstrated that the largest items being imported into the United
States were cut flowers, copper cathodes, precious metals, pigments, non-
canned tuna, and zinc. 87 A comparison of the Andean imports in the
same 1995-2000 period showed some minimal changes in composition. 88
But, the Report continues, the changes were not necessarily predicable.819
Specifically, cut flowers, while still the largest import from the region,
have fallen as a percentage of the total.90 In contrast, as a percentage of
the total, copper cathodes, pigments, and zinc have all increased.9'
While this represents some evidence that there is a change on the indi-
vidual article level of import composition in the areas covered by the
Trade Preference Act, data explored by the CRS Report and by the U.S.
International Trade Commission does not clearly indicate that the small
changes have occurred exclusively, or even primarily, because of the
Trade Preference Act.92 Rather, it is equally likely that changes in the
domestic policies of the beneficiary countries themselves might be re-
sponsible for the changes.93 In Bolivia, for example, while there was an
increase in jewelry and wood exports to the United States coinciding with
the benefits of the Trade Preference Act, these increases could just as
likely have come from changes in the country's tax code that affected
wood products and jewelry production. 94
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 8; see also Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3203(b)(1), (4) (1991).
85. HORNBECK, CRS REPORT, supra note 3, at 3; see also Andean Trade Preference
Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3203(b)(1), (4) (1991).




90. Id. at 8.
9t. HORNBECK, CRS REPORT, supra note 3, at 7-8.
92. See id. at 8-9.
93. Id. at 9-10.
94. Id.
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C. DOMESTIC EFFECTS
Decision makers, in deciding whether to continue the benefits provided
under the Trade Preference Act, likely looked also to the Act's effect on
domestic markets and employment. Unlike the reports published by the
Congressional Research Service and the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission, which detail the Act's effects on foreign markets, the U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office and the U.S. Department of Labor provide
reports similarly detailing the Act's domestic effects. 9 5
In its March 2001 report, the U.S. General Accounting Office ad-
dressed the effects of the Trade Preference Act specifically as it related to
American asparagus producers and consumers. 96 The Asparagus Report,
commissioned by the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate on
behalf of the American asparagus industry, found that the Trade Prefer-
ence Act was a mixed blessing for American asparagus. 97
Peru is the second largest asparagus importer to the United States, and
benefits from the enhanced trade status under the Trade Preference
Act.98 Specifically, the Asparagus Report indicates that Peruvian aspara-
gus comprised approximately thirty-four percent of American asparagus
imports in 1999.99 While Peru has traditionally enjoyed success in pro-
ducing and importing fresh asparagus, the 1990s saw a marked increase in
the Peruvian export of frozen and processed asparagus.' 00
The Asparagus Report noted that this increase in Peruvian asparagus
was both good and bad in the context of the American asparagus mar-
ket.10' As a positive, Peruvian importation of fresh asparagus during the
months between August and December, months when fresh domestic as-
paragus is normally not grown, provides the American asparagus con-
sumers with the benefit of year-round fresh asparagus. 02 But as a
negative, this increase in the availability of fresh asparagus has led to a
decreased demand in the United States for domestically processed and
frozen asparagus.' 03 Between 1990 and 2000, covering the period the
Trade Preference Act was in effect, the total value of American processed
asparagus significantly decreased. 04 From $60 million in 1990, the value
of processed and frozen asparagus fell to $44 million in 2000, marking a
95. See U. S. DEI"T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, TRADE AND EM-
PLOYMENT EFFECTS OF THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE ACT, SEVENTH AN-
NUAL REPORT To CONGRESS (Aug. 25, 2001) [hereinafter SEVENTH LABOR
REPORT]; see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACTS OF THE ANDEAN
TRAI)E PREFERENCE AC-[ ON ASPARAGUS PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS, REPORT
TO CONGRESS (March 2001) [hereinafter GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT
(2001)].
96. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT (2001), supra note 94 at 1.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT (2001), supra note 93.
102. Id. at 2.
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id.
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twenty-five percent decrease.' 05 Additionally, the Report notes that Pe-
ruvian asparagus has displaced between two percent and eight percent of
the total value of fresh domestic asparagus.' 06
In 2001, the U.S. Department of Labor, as required by the Trade Pref-
erence Act, released a report exploring the Act's effect on domestic trade
and employment."'17 The Report's main finding is, generally, that the pre-
ferred treatment under the Trade Preference Act has not had a significant
negative effect on American markets and employment.' 08
The Labor Department report finds that while several American indus-
tries suffered employment downturns, those downturns could not be
clearly attributed to the Trade Preference Act.' 09 But the Report did
suggest exceptions." 0 Although many areas of employment remained
fundamentally strong, the manufacturing sector lost some 533,000 jobs
between 1990 and 1993.1 11 While there is by no means a consensus, some
economists believe that the increase in Andean imports may be a partial
cause of those losses." 2 Additionally, the Department of Labor Report,
similar to the GAO report, notes that duty-free trade under the Trade
Preference Act has affected the asparagus industry'13 Moreover, there
was a decrease, although a small one, in the number of food industry jobs
between 1990 and 1999.1"4
Just as the U.S. International Trade Commission found it difficult to
isolate the effects specific to the Trade Preference Act on changes to im-
port content, the Department of Labor struggled to isolate the effects
specific to the Trade Preference Act on changing trends in American
markets and employment.' 15
The cut flower industry is one specific area in which the Department of
Labor found a detrimental effect by the Trade Preference Act.' 16 Al-
though in the year immediately before expiration, there was a decrease in
cut flowers from the Andean area, each year between then and 1990 saw
a consistent increase in imports of those cut flowers.' 17 Even with the
recent import decrease, rose imports under the Trade Preference Act still
gained an increased share in the U.S. markets." 8 The Labor Department
Report further noted, "the preferences granted under the ATPA program
105. See General Accounting Office Report (2001).
106. Id. at 2.
107. See The Andean Trade Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 102-182, § 201, 105 Stat. 1233,
1236-44 (codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (1991)); see also GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING; OFFICE REPORT (2001), supra note 94.










118. SEVENTH LA13OR REPORT, supra note 94.
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for roses continue to be a factor in the production declines in the domes-
tic rose industry."' 19 The Report concludes its discussion of cut flowers
by stating, "[t]he large volume of U.S. imports from the ATPA nations
and the continual decrease in domestic production of carnations and cut
roses, and to a lesser extent to chrysanthemums, over the last several
years does suggest that ATPA imports may be negatively affecting U.S.
production of these flowers."' 20
And just as there was minimal evidence to support the conclusion that
the Trade Preference Act has had some positive effect on Andean trade,
there is similarly some evidence that supports the conclusion that those
trade benefits have negatively affected the U.S. markets and employ-
ment.' 2' But neither the wholly unconvincing positive benefits nor the
wholly unremarkable negative side effects deterred Congress and the
president from renewing and extending the Trade Preference Act at its
expiration.' 22 At the time for its renewal, Trade Preference Act propo-
nents argued that its goal was as much a symbolic statement of support
for Andean development as it was for the broad anti-narcotic efforts on
the United States.' 23 At the turn of the decade, those same supporters
not only supported renewal, extension and expansion of the Trade Prefer-
ence Act, notwithstanding lack of direct evidence regarding its positive
effectiveness, but also favored including Venezuela as a beneficiary
country.' 24
IV. THE 2002 ANDEAN TRADE PROMOTION AND
DRUG ERADICATION ACT
Although there was a short period-less than one year-after the expi-
ration of the decade-long tenure of the Andean Trade Preference Act
when the Act had no effect, the proponents of the Act eventually won
out.' 2 5 In late 2002, the 107th Congress passed and the President signed
the Trade Promotion Act of 2002.126 The Act passed with a solid major-
ity in the Senate, but by only three votes in the House of Representa-




122. See Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002).
123. See HORNBECK, CRS REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-10.
124. Id. at 13.
125. See Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002).
126. Id.
127. Senate Roll Call Vote, H.IR. 3009, 107th Cong (2002), availahle at http://www.sen-
ate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call-lists/roll-call-vote-cfm.cfm?congress=107&session
-2&vote=00207; House of Representatives Roll Call Vote, H.R. 3009, 107th Cong
(2002), available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/rol370.xml. Perhaps this is
some indication by the House of Representatives that it was not entirely confident
in the new provisions.
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of the Trade Preference Act.128 Revised and repackaged as the Andean
Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, this update of the Trade
Preference Act sought to capitalize on the pcrccivcd "succcsscs" of its
predecessor and correct the observed faults by adding increased benefits
to countries and to the goods and articles that they seek to export to the
United States.'129
Before proceeding into the details of the revised trade benefits, it is
interesting to look at the Congressional "findings" published at the begin-
ning of the Andean Trade Preference Act section of the Trade Promotion
Act of 2002.130 Despite the U.S. International Trade Commission's re-
ports, as well as Congress's own Research Service findings, the Trade Pro-
motion Act rhetorically proclaims that the "Andean Trade Preference
Act has been a key element in the United States counternarcotics strat-
egy in the Andean region, promoting export diversification and broad-
based economic development that provides sustainable economic alterna-
tives to drug-crop production, strengthening the legitimate economies of
Andean countries and creating viable alternatives to illicit trade in
coca." 13' Results from the data analysis do not readily support this
sweeping conclusion. Rather, such an inflated statement of the Trade
Preference Act's success is likely only symbolic, a reiteration of the
United States' goal to combat illegal narcotics production and trafficking
from the Andean region.
Assuming they can be taken at face value, the congressional findings
demonstrate some other positive effects the Trade Preference Act has
had that would warrant the Act's expansion.' 32 For example, the findings
note that further enhancement of legitimate trade between the United
States and the Andean beneficiary countries provides an "alternative
means for reviving and stabilizing the economies in the Andean re-
gion." 133 Additionally, the findings note that renewal and expansion of
the Trade Preference Act can lead to the increased confidence of "domes-
tic private enterprise and foreign investors in the economic prospects of
the region, ensuring that legitimate private enterprise can be the engine
of economic development and political stability in the region." 134
A. COUNTRY QUALIFICATIONS AND BENEFITED PRODUCTS
Regardless of the precise reasons for renewal and expansion, Congress
passed, and the President signed, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug
Eradication Act, which provided further trade enhancements to the coun-
128. See Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002).
129. Id.
130. See id. at § 3102.
131. Id. at § 3102(2).
132. See id. at § 3102.
133. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-2 10,
116 Stat. 933, § 3102(4) (2002).
134. Id. at § 3102(6).
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tries in the Andean Region. 135 First, the Andean Trade Promotion and
Drug Eradication Act renewed all of the provisions existing in the An-
dean Trade Preference Act. 3 6' All of the same eligibility qualifications
and requirements for those benefits apply.' 37 But the new Trade Prefer-
ence Act expanded the benefits to over 5,500 items.' 38 This included an
expansion of nearly seven hundred articles with the Trade Act
additions. '39
Among the articles still ineligible for duty-free or reduced tariff status
are: certain textile and apparel articles; rum and tafia; certain sugars, syr-
ups, and sugar-containing products; and tuna prepared or preserved in
airtight containers.' 40 Other items, previously ineligible under the 1991
Trade Preference Act, now have the option to gain eligibility under the
Trade Promotion Act.' 4 ' If accompanied by a proclamation by the Presi-
dent that duty-free treatment under the Act is not import-sensitive, these
items may also qualify for duty-free status.' 42 Examples of these articles
are footwear; petroleum products and products derived from petroleum;
watches and watch parts; and handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves,
and leather apparel.' 43
The new and expanded benefits of the Act are not, however, auto-
matic. They must be qualified for separately from the parts of the pro-
gram initiated under the original Trade Preference Act. Under the Trade
Promotion Act, before the new beneficiary status may be granted and the
new benefits begin, the President must investigate to discover whether
each of the countries meets the eligibility standards established in the Act
before.' 44 Unlike the Trade Preference Act, the Trade Promotion Act
provides for interagency review of a country's qualifications before ad-
mission as a beneficiary country.' 45 Additionally, the new procedures al-
low for the public to make comments, and for those comments to be a
part of the eligibility qualification process.' 46
In September of 2002, Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru were granted the
new trade benefits under the Trade Promotion Act.' 47 By the end of Oc-
tober 2002, by presidential proclamation, all four Andean countries had
135. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210,
116 Stat. 933 (2002).
136. Press Release, The Office of the United States Trade Representative, New Andean
Trade Benefits Fact Sheet (Sept. 25, 2002), http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Li-
bra ry/Fact-Sheets/2002fNewAndeanTradeBenefts. html I[hereinafter New An-
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143. Id. at § 3103(b)(1).
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been made beneficiaries under the new Act.'148 Venezuela was not added
as a potential beneficiary country under the Trade Promotion Act.' 49
B. FOREIGN EFFECTIVENESS
Much like the first Trade Preference Act, the Trade Promotion Act re-
quired regular reports regarding the effectiveness of the Act in achieving
its stated objectives.' 50 The first report issued by the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative after the passage of the revised Trade Promotion
Act was in 2003.'51 The Trade Representative's report notes that be-
tween the implementation of the first act and 2002, there was an eighty-
three percent Increase in two-way trade between the United States and
Andean beneficiary countries.'15 2 But there was less than a one percent
increase in two-way trade between 2002 and 2003 for the same region.' 53
Primarily because of weak demand in the United States for many of the
largest imported goods coming from the Andean Region, imports from
those Andean countries had been declining since 2000.'154 Those numbers
might be skewed, however, because for much of 2002, the region was not
under the duty-free enhancements of the Trade Preference Act.'155 For an
eight-month period during 2002, the Trade Preference Act had expired,
and Congress had not yet acted to pass its counterpart.15 6
The second report issued by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive provides a better look at the data.'15 7 Issued in 2005. the report cov-
ers 2003 and 2004.158 The report indicates that two-way trade between
the United States and Andean beneficiary countries has continued to in-
crease since the first report.' 59 Two-way trade increased by thirteen per-
cent in 2003 and by an additional twenty-seven percent in 2004.160 In all,
imports from the region have more than tripled since the trade program's
first enactment in 1991.161 During the recent years of the Trade Prefer-
ence agreement, the leading imports from the Andean regions have been
148. Proclamation No. 7616, 67 Fed. Reg. 67,283 (Nov. 5, 2002).
149. See Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002).
150. See Id. at §§ 3202(f), 3103(f).
151. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FIRST REPORT TrO THE CONGRESS
ON THE OPERAITION OF THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE Acu As AMENDED
(April 30, 2003), http://www.ustr.govfTrade-Development/Preference-Programs/
ATPA/Reports/Section-Index.html [hereinafter FIRST TRADE REPORT].
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 8-9.
155. Id. at 9.
156. FIRST TRADE REPORT, supra note 150.
157. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SECOND REPORT ON THE OPERA-
TION OF THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE AGREEMENT As AMENDED (2005),
available at http://www.sice.oas.orgFfPD/USA-ATPA/Studies/2005 Report-...pdf
[ hereinafter SECOND TRAD3E REPORT].
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mineral fuels, along with gemstones, apparel, cut flowers, fruits and nuts,
coffee, copper articles, fish, tin, and vegetables. 62
At this point, nearly ninety percent of all U.S. imports coming from the
Andean beneficiary countries entered by way of the benefits provided
under the Trade Preference Act, Trade Promotion Act, and the GS P. 16 3
The report continues, noting that between 2002, when the Andean Trade
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act was enacted, and 2003, the percent-
age of imports from the Andean region that came into the United States
duty-free rose from approximately fifty-three percent in 2002 to eighty-
five percent in 2003. 164
More importantly, however, the 2007 report issued by the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission found that any effects of the Trade Promotion
Act on illicit narcotics were minimal and indirect.' 65 In fact, in Bolivia,
Colombia, and Peru during the period the Act was in effect, the net land
area in which coca cultivation actually took place had increased.' 66 Even
so, growth in cut flowers and asparagus production in recent years had
reportedly provided job opportunities to Andean workers, giving them an
alternative to engaging in coca related job activities.' 67
C. DOMESTIc EFFEcTS
Just as the original Trade Preference Act required, the Trade Promo-
tion Act required submission of reports from the U.S. Department of La-
bor addressing the program's impact on the domestic markets and
employment.'168 In early 2006, the Department of Labor submitted its
report for 2005, coinciding with what was supposed to be the end of the
Trade Promotion Act's term.'16 9
This report, similar to the one four years earlier, noted the difficulty of
accurately judging the Act's effects.'17 0 Specifically, the Report observed,
"a definitive evaluation of the domestic employment impact of the
ATPA/ATPDEA cannot be made because the effects of the duty-free
provisions on U.S. imports cannot be isolated from the effects of other
trade preference programs such as the [Generalized System of Prefer-
ences]."' 7'1 Even so, the Department of Labor report states that it is un-
likely that either Act has significantly affected overall employment in the
162. SECOND TRADE REPORT, supra note 156. at 7.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE ACT: IMPACT ON U.S.
INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS AND ON DRUG CROP' ERADICATION AND CROP SUI3-
S FITUI ION, 2007, USITC Publication 4037 (Sept. 2008). http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/
docs/pubs/332/pub4037.pdf [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION RE-
PORT (2007)].
166. Id. at x-xi.
167. Id. at xi.
168. Seventh Labor Report, supra note 94.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 18
171. Id.
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United States.' 72 The overall level of American imports from Andean
countries, it reports, has remained relatively small-only about 1.1% of
total American imports.' 73 Moreover, the reports notes that even with
"the inclusion of additional products. .. that were previously excluded
from the ATPA[,] . the amounts enter[ing] duty-free have remained
quite modest."' 74
Interestingly, the Report finds that while the Andean Trade Program
offers an incentive for beneficiary countries to diversify their product ex-
ports, subsequent trade agreements between the United States and other
countries could negatively affect the Andean Trade Arrangements.175
Specifically, trade arrangements with Canada, Jordan, Singapore, Chile,
and Australia have "reduced the margin of tariff preference available to
the ATPA/ATPDEA beneficiaries."'176 Generally, however, the Report
indicates that the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
has not had a significant negative impact on U.S. markets and
employment.'177
Also notable, however, is the report the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission issued in 2008.178 This report, covering data gathered from 2007,
provides an informative summary of the effects of the new Trade Promo-
tion Act.'79 The report identifies three primary ways in which the Act
can affect the United States.1810 First, it could affect "U.S. consumers by
providing lower prices and increased product variety." 81 Second, it
could affect the United States Treasury by decreasing revenue derived
from tariffs.'82 Finally, it could affect American producers by displacing
American producers of goods with those offered through the enhanced-
treatment program.'813
As with the Department of Labor Report, the Trade Commission's
findings indicate a minimal economic impact on the American Econ-
omny.' 84 And like the Department of Labor and the Asparagus Report,
the Trade Commission' s report notes that the two domestic industries
most affected by the Trade Preference Act and Trade Promotion Acts
were cut-flowers and chilled asparagus.185
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. SEVENTH LABOR REPORTr, supra note 94.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See SEVENTH LA13OR REPORTr, supra note 94.
178. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT (2007), supra note 164.
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V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Three further developments regarding the Trade Preference Act and
the Trade Promotion Act are noteworthy. First, near the expiration of
the Trade Promotion Act, Congress and the President passed a series of
short-term extension, continuing the Act's effectiveness throughout the
subsequent few years. The second noteworthy development was the con-
tinued attempt by the United States and most of the beneficiary nations
of the Andean region to create and initiate a formal and permanent Free
Trade Agreement. During the later period of continuing extension, be-
ginning approximately in May of 2004, the United States began negotia-
tions with Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru regarding the possible formation
of Free Trade Agreements, with Bolivia participating only as an observer.
The final major development, occurring in late 2008, was the demise of
Bolivia as a beneficiary country under the Act.
A. PRELIMINARY EXTENSIONS
As with the original Trade Preference Act, the Trade Promotion Act
was not an indefinite creation. 186 Rather, Congress gave this subsequent
version of the Trade Preference Act a much shorter life span-only four
years.'817 The Act specified that preferential treatment status for all bene-
ficiary countries was not to extend beyond December 31, 2006.188 Even
so, in December of 2006. Congress and President Bush passed the first of
several extensions to the lapsing Trade Promotion Act.' 89 This first ex-
tension was to last approximately six months, extending the operation of
the Act through June 30, 2007.190 In early July of 2007, Congress and
President Bush passed a second extension.' 9' This second extension fur-
ther lengthened operation of the Act by an additional eight months, set-
ting the Act to expire again in early 2008, at which time the Act was
subsequently extended for another ten months.' 92
But even then, the extensions continued. On October 16, 2008, Presi-
dent Bush signed into law H.R. 7222, the Andean Trade Preference Act
Extension.' 93 This Act, like the predecessor extension, was meant to
carry operation of the Preference Agreements into the future.' 94 With
186. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210,
116 Stat. 933 (2002).
187. Id. at § 3104(a).
188. Id.
189. See Press Release, The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Expresses
Appreciation for Extension of ATPA Preferences (July 2, 2007), http://www.sice.
oas.org/TPD/USA-ATPAIUSTR-extension072-.e.pdf.
190. Id.
191. US Senate OKs 8-mionth Andean Trade Pact Extension, REuTrERS, June 28, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN27294490.
192. Congress Extends Andean Trade Benefits 10 Months. REUTERS. Feb. 28. 2008.
www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN2860042120080228.
193. See Press Release, The White House, President Bush Signs H.R. 7222. the Andean
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that extension, President Bush again extended the Act only for a short
period. 195 H.R. 7222 called for the expiration of preferential status of all
beneficiary countries by December 31, 2 0 0 9 .196
B. FORMAL TRADE AGREEMENT TALKS
As early as 2003, President Bush directed U.S. Trade Representative
Robert B. Zoellick to begin negotiations with the Andean countries to
form a regional free trade agreement.'19 7 Intending to begin these negoti-
ations in mid 2004, the President meant only to include Colombia and
Peru in the first set of trade agreements.' 98 Zoellick stated that "Ja]n
FTA with Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. .. will help foster eco-
nomic growth and create higher paying jobs in the United States hy re-
ducing and eliminating barriers to trade and investment between the
Andean countries and the United States." 199 Almost as a side note, Zoel-
lick mentioned the relevance of the proposed trade agreement in continu-
ing to advance goals of combating Andean narcotics production.20
With talks proceeding through the following years, Representative
Zoellick concluded trade talks with Peru in 2005.201 In December 2005,
Zoellick announced the completion of a comprehensive trade agreement,
an agreement that is "a key building block in our strategy to advance free
trade within our hemisphere, which we hope to later bring in [sic] the
other Andean countries including Colombia and Ecuador." 202 But there
was no mention of Bolivia.2 )3
Later, in February 2006, the United States and Colombia completed
their trade agreement talks.2114 Creating a similarly comprehensive trade
agreement, Representative Zoellick mentioned, although he did not em-
phasize, that the agreement with Colombia "is an essential component of
our regional strategy to. . . combat narco-trafficking. 205 Again, there
was no mention of Bolivia.206 The President, the U.S. Congress, and the
Peruvian government formalized the trade agreements in the United
195. Andean Trade Preference Act Act Extension, Pub. L. No. 110-436, 122 Stat 4976
(2008).
196. Id.
197. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Notifies Congress
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204. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Colum-
bia Conclude Free Trade Agreement (Feb. 27, 2006), http://lists.essential.org/piper
mail/ip-health/2006-February/0091I68.html [Free Trade Agreement].
205. Id.
206. See id.
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States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement.207
While the Trade Preference Act and the Trade Promotion Act have
primarily focused on providing trade benefits to the Andean countries,
these new formal trade agreements create a mechanism for two-way
trade, allowing U.S. industries to access the foreign Andean markets. 208
C. THE DEMISE OF BOLIVIA
The final major development in the Andean Trade Preference saga was
the demise of Bolivia. This demise culminated on November 25, 2008.209
On that day, President Bush signed a presidential proclamation that sus-
pended Bolivia's designation as a beneficiary country. 210 According to a
statement released by then White House Press Secretary Dana Perino,
the suspension, which was to take effect in mid-December, was "the re-
sult of Bolivia's failure to cooperate with the United States on coun-
ternarcotics efforts."121' Such cooperation was one of the requirements
for eligibility under both the Trade Preference Act and the Trade Promo-
tion Act.2 12 Press Secretary Perino's released statement closed by saying
that '[iff Bolivia were to improve its performance under the ATPA and
ATPDEA programs' criteria, the President would have the discretion to
issue a proclamation to redesignate Bolivia as a beneficiary country. 213
Given the turmoil within Bolivia and the seemingly shaky relationship
between the United States and Bolivia in the preceding months, it should
have come as no surprise that the exchange resulted in the suspension of
Bolivia's trade beneficiary status. Hints of the problems were detectable
several months before.214 For example, earlier that year, amid internal
strife and political turmoil, President Evo Morales of Bolivia strongly ad-
vocated that U.S. Ambassador Philip S. Goldberg should be expelled
from the country.2t 5
In September of 2008, declaring Ambassador Goldberg a "persona non
grata," President Morales claimed that Ambassador Goldberg had been
in league with his political enemies. 216 Specifically, President Morales ac-
cused Ambassador Goldberg of conspiring against the unity of the Boliv-
ian people and threatening its democracy.217 President Morales further
accused Ambassador Goldberg of being the mastermind behind the con-
tinuing violent conflicts between the eastern and western lowland regions
207. Proclamation No. 8341, 74 Fed. Reg. 13 (Jan. 22, 2009).
208. See Free Trade Agreement, supra note 203.
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of Bolivia.2t 8 The accusations even went so far as to declare that Ambas-
sador Goldberg had "arranged for a media 'dirty war' against Morales
and is now encouraging the violent takeover of government institutions
to force out the president."1219 The United States responded to Bolivia's
expulsion by similarly expelling Bolivia's ambassador. 220
The situation improved very little in the subsequent months. In No-
vember of 2008, Bolivian President Evo Morales ordered that the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency be removed from Bolivia.22' With his para-
noia apparently still raging, President Morales accused the U.S. Drug En-
forcement agents of political espionage. 222 He claimed the agents were
financing criminal organizations to act against President Morales, as well
as "maintaining ties with anti-government groups that staged violent
protests."1223
These activities, combined with a marked increase in cocaine produc-
tion within Bolivia, the government's failure to close illegal coca farms,
and the stated government policies that increase sanctioned coca cultiva-
tion, were enough to cause President Bush to begin the procedure for
removing Bolivia's trade preference status.2 24
According to the text of both the Andean Trade Preference Act and
the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, the President
has the authority to withdraw or suspend the beneficiary designation of
any beneficiary country.225 In order to do this, the acts require that the
president publish, in the Federal Register, a notice of the proposed action
to withdraw or suspend the status at least thirty-days prior to taking sus-
pension actions. 226 During that thirty-day waiting period, the U.S. Trade
Representative is tasked with accepting public comments regarding the
action and holding a public hearing on the action.227
Although the facts of the situation seemed to demonstrate that Bo-
livia's non-cooperation was not likely to change in the future, the decision
to suspend its trade preferential status was not universally applauded by
U.S. lawmakers. 228 For example, Congressman Eliot Engel, Chairman of
the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
218. Id.
219. Jean Friedman- Rudavsky, supra note 231.
220. Morales: Government Will Take Over for the DEA in Bolivia, CNN, Nov. 1, 2008,
h ttp://www.cnn.com/2008/WO RLD/americas/t 11/0 1 /bol ivia.dea/index.html.
221. Carlos Quiroga, Bolivia's Morales Bars "Spying" U.S. DEA Agents, REUTERS,




224. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Trade Representative Schwab An-
nounces Proposed Suspension of Bolivia's Tariff Benefits (Sept. 26, 2008) (on file
with author).
225. Andean Trade Preference Act. Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105 Stat. 1233 (1991).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See Press Release, Congressman Eliot Engel, Engel Objects to Suspension of Bo-
livia from Andean Trade Preferences (Oct. 23, 2008), http://foreignaffairs.house.
gov/press-.display.asp?sub-id-137.
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released a press statement expressing his displeasure with the decision .2 2 9
The Chairman argued that such a suspension "would unfortunately do
more harm than good. .. [it] would empower champions of anti-Ameri-
canism, and would make the United States less and less relevant in Bo-
livia."123 11 In the end, however, the Administration prevailed and Bolivia's
status was suspended.23'
Bolivia's President, Evo Morales, received Bolivia's suspension
poorl y.2 32 Days after President Bush issued the proclamation removing
Bolivia's status, President Morales responded by accusing President Bush
and the United States of "political vengeance."1233 Specifically, President
Morales cited data from the United Nations, insisting that the United
States' claims of non-cooperation were incorrect. 234 President Morales
asserted that Bolivia had done a better job of complying with the require-
ments of the Andean Trade Preference Agreements than both Peru and
Colombia. 235 President Morales believed that Bolivia's suspension re-
sulted less from non-compliance with requirements than from Bolivia's
disagreement with "capitalism, provoked wars [,]. . . or the free
market."12 3 6
United Nations' data tends to support President Morales' statements,
at least in part .2 37 According to the reports from the United Nations,
"4coca crops expanded to cover nearly 250,000 acres (100,000 hectares) in
Colombia in 2007 and over 124,000 acres (50,000 hectares) in Peru, while
in Bolivia coca-growing area was roughly stable at 69,200 acres (28,000
hectares)."12 3 11 And yet, both Peru and Colombia continue to receive ben-
efits under the Andean Trade Preference Acts.
President Morales was so outraged by the perceived political retalia-
tion that he, and Bolivia, prepared a litigious response. 239 President
Morales said, "Bolivia had prepared an international lawsuit to enforce
the rules."1240 Instead of proceeding with the lawsuit, however, President
Morales suspended it, hopeful that then President-Elect Barack Obama
would be able to "repair this injustice, this vengeance."124' President
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Press Release, The White House, Statement by Press Secretary Dana Perino (Nov.
26, 2008) (on file with author).
232. Carlos Quiroga, Bolivia calls U.S. Trade Move "Political Vengeance", REUTrERS,
Nov. 27, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?article ld=USTRE4AQ7HA
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Morales thought this to be an act of good will, designed to demonstrate a
willingness to improve relations with the incoming President.242 This is
especially so because indications suggest that Bolivia would have a strong
case at the World Trade Organization.243 Under the rules of the World
Trade Organization, "countries are allowed to establish rules for prefer-
ential access to their markets, but the rules must be applied equally to all
countries receiving the preferences. 4
While the situation would appear to suggest that repairing the relation-
ship between Bolivia and the United States might be a protracted affair,
the changing of administrations in the United States seems to bring re-
newed eagerness on the part of the wayward former Andean partner to-
wards renewing the trade agreements. 245  With President Obama's
administration, Bolivia might take the opportunity to try for a fresh
start.246 It has been reported that President Morales has expressed some
desire to redefine trade relationships with the Obama administration. 247
Bolivian Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca has also stated that the
Bolivian government would be interested in renewing ties with the
United States and accepting an American ambassador back into
Bolivia.248
Although President Morales has presumably taken steps to work to-
wards improving the relationship between Bolivia and the United States,
most notably by refraining from filing the international lawsuit at the
World Trade Organization, there appears to be another obstacle in the
path of renewed cooperation. 249 At the same time that President Bush
was in the process of suspending Bolivia's beneficiary status, the Bolivian
government was in the process of voting on a new constitution .25 0 This
new constitution declared that health care is a human right and thus is not
susceptible to privatization. 25' In doing so, Bolivia requested the World
Trade Organization's permission to rescind its commitment to open its
medical facilities and health care industry to foreign corpora tions.252 The
United States, still operating under President Bush's administration, ob-
jected to this request.253
Since then, President Obama has taken office and his administration
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plaint to the World Trade Organization. 25 4 If President Obama wishes to
improve relations with Bolivia, it will likely rescind the complaint. 255 But
even though President Obama has not taken any further affirmative steps
towards rebuilding relations with President Morales and Bolivia, the U.S.
House of Representatives has become active in the Bolivia trade
arena. 2 56 As recently as March 3, 2009, the House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing specifically designed to dis-
cuss the future of the United States-Bolivia relations. 25 7
At the Congressional Hearing, the members talked generally about
how Bolivia has made developmental progress in some areas, but that
President Morales' actions and rhetoric are inconsistent with a renewed
spirit of cooperation between Bolivia and the United States .25 8 Specifi-
cally, Amibassador DeShazo, now director of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies Americas Program, commented at the hearing that
President Morales' re-election campaign speeches were filled with anti-
American rhetoric .2 59 President Morales declared that, if re-elected, he
would be "a nightmare for America."12 6 0 Ambassador DeShazo spoke
further, indicating that while it is possible for a repaired relationship be-
tween the nations in the future, it is equally likely that the situation could
worsen. 2 6'1 Ambassador DeShazo continued, suggesting that it would be-
hoove the new Obama administration to take a first step towards rebuild-
ing relations by some form of unilateral initiative. 262
Kathryn Ledebur, director of the Andean Information Network, sug-
gests that instead of focusing on unilateral actions, rebuilding the United
States-Bolivia relationship would be served best by reinstating mutual
ambassadors in the countries.263 Without this open line of diplomatic
channels, the United States and Bolivia would continue to talk to each
other through the media and other indirect channels, with largely unpro-
ductive and highly inflammatory statements.264
Dr. Daremblum, Director for the Center of Latin American Studies,
preceded with a different rationale for improving Bolivia-American rela-
tion S.2 65 Dr. Daremblum focused not on the United States' anti-narcotics
efforts, but instead on the other strategic resources Bolivia has, primarily
natural gas.2 66 He referred to the recently increased ties between Bolivia
254. Weisbrot, supra note 238.
255. Id.
256. See U.S.-Bolivia Relations: Looking Ahead, Before Subcornn. on the W. H-emi-
sphere, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs. 111th Cong. (2009), http://foreignaffairs.
house.gov/hearingnotice.asp?id=1050 (hearing viewed via webcast).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 3.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. U.S.-Bolivia Relations: Looking Ahead Hearing, supra note 255.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 18.
264. Id. at 26.
265. Id.
266. U.S.-Bolivia Relations: Looking Ahead Hearing, supra note 255.
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and Iran, and between Bolivia and Venezuela, two countries with which
the United States currently does not share the best relations.267 By re-
opening trade enhancements and improving relations with Bolivia, the
United States would be working to limit this increasing relationship.268
Congressman Engel, in a press release issued shortly after Dr. Darem-
blum's statements, called for President Morales' administration and Pres-
ident Obama to "immediately initiate a high level bilateral dialogue that
can quickly result in an exchange of ambassadors, a renewed strategy for
joint counternarcotics efforts, and in turn, a reinstatement of. .. benefits
for Bolivia.269"1
Vt. CONCLUSION
The Bush Administration's repeated short-term extensions seem to
demonstrate a lack of full commitment to the program. Appearing more
as a stopgap measure designed to keep trade continuing while real, for-
mal trade arrangements talks are ongoing, these minimal extensions
likely create an uncertain business atmosphere in the Andean region.
But most notably, Bolivia has not been among the countries with which
the United States seeks to establish full, formal trade ties.
The results from numerous studies indicate that any positive effects the
Trade Preference Act and the Trade Promotion Act have had on illegal
narcotics trade in the Andean region remain quantitatively small. None-
theless, the presence of the Act has remained of both symbolic and actual
importance, both to the United States and to the Andean beneficiary na-
tions. As President Obama begins anew for the United States, perhaps
his administration will continue to seek expansion and extension of the
Andean Trade Preference Programs and continue the steps the countries
have taken together towards forming a regional Free Trade Agreement
and making real progress towards curbing the illegal narcotics production
and trade in the Andean region. In doing so, however, special attention
should focus on Bolivia, as to do otherwise would invite President
Morales to continue to build relationships with those countries far more
unfriendly to the United States, and would leave the world's third-largest
cocoa producer free from the subtle influences of American diplomacy.
267. Id. at 4 1.
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